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Abstract Theoretical and experimental studies from psychological and behavioral
sciences show that heuristics and social networks play an important role in decision-
making under risk. The goal of this paper is to investigate the effects of empirical
social networks and different behavioral rules on farmers’ irrigation adoption under
drought risk and its impacts on several macroeconomic indicators such as the rate of
adaptation, water demand and regional agricultural income.We present an application
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of a spatial economic ABM which is able to simulate the effect of droughts on crop
production, farm income and farm decision-making. The agents’ population is para-
meterized using survey data, including data on social networks. Four experiments are
conducted combining two climate scenarios with two behavioral scenarios (maximiz-
ers vs. heuristic-based agents). The results show that the adoption process follows a
different path in the scenario with heuristic-based farmers. The adoption of irrigation
is slower in the short run due to reliance on information from social networks and farm-
ers’ uncertainty regarding drought events. This results in agricultural income loss and a
lower water demand in the short run compared to the scenario withmaximizing agents.
Mathematics Subject Classification Q150 Drought; Irrigation; Farm · D010
Bounded rationality · D030 Heuristic Agent based model
1 Introduction
Patterns of regional development are largely driven by choices of economic actors.
A dynamic pathway toward the prosperity or impoverishment of a region is shaped
by many individual economic choices amplified through social interactions and sub-
ject to institutional and geographical environments (Boshuizen et al. 2009; Batten
2001). Moreover, the future economic welfare of regions worldwide relies on specific
manifestations of climate change, most of which require adaptation to their adverse
consequences (IPCC2014).When studying climate adaptation, the uncertainties about
climate change, individual behavior and economic consequences are large. Therefore,
an effective policy formulation in which private and public adaptation initiatives are
aligned is a challenging task. To be successful, one needs to explore the consequences
of adaptive choices under risk as our investment decisions today shape spatial patterns
of development and economic welfare of regions in the future. Analytical, statisti-
cal, equilibrium and computational simulation models serve as tools to support policy
makers at the local, regional or country level.
Models employed in the economic discipline often rely on the assumptions of a
rational representative economic agent maximizing its goal function under conditions
of perfect information and in the absence of biases or information asymmetries. This
allows for elegant solutions yielding a unique equilibrium. Yet, there is an increasing
trend in economic literature to question the appropriateness and consequences of
these assumptions (Arthur 1999; Tesfatsion 2002; Farmer and Foley 2009), especially
if interactions with the natural system are considered (Liu et al. 2007). Economic
models are being extended to account for out-of-equilibrium dynamics (Arthur 2006),
agent heterogeneity (Kirman2006), bounded rationality (Simon1997) and interactions
between agents (Axtell 2005). In the context of climate change, probabilistic risks
and uncertainty need to be explicitly considered, which load even more weight on
the level of complexity expected from economic models. Traditionally, they rely on
expected utility theory (EUT) to capture decisions under uncertainty. EUTassumes that
individual decision-makers quantify uncertainties on all possible states of the world,
value and weight them on their probability of occurrence and choose the alternative
with the highest expected utility (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Yet, there
is growing evidence from the psychological and behavioral literature that people are
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boundedly rational and that intuitive processes or heuristics and information from
social networks are utilized to make decisions under risk.
Specifically, empirical and experimental studies show that risk perception, experien-
tial factors, feelings of dread orworry, perceived self-efficacy and perceived behavioral
control bias individual decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Rogers 1975;
MadduxandRogers 1983; Slovic 1987;Ajzen2002; Slovic et al. 2004, 2007). Prospect
theory, for example, shows that individuals are biased in their risk judgement because
they weigh uncertain negative consequences much more heavily than uncertain gains
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Moreover, many eco-
nomic choices are subject to an influence from social networks (Jackson 2010). The
social amplification of risk framework states that individual risk perceptions are sus-
ceptible to social norms through interactions within social networks (Kasperson et al.
1988). Social interaction, disaster risk experience and risk mitigating behavior are
processes underlying individual and social learning and may change preferences and
decision over time.
Quantitative models, which are capable of incorporating these behavioral aspects
to explore the cumulative economic consequences of climate risk and compare them
to aggregated outcomes based on traditional economic assumptions, are in demand.
Ideally, such a model should also be spatially explicit as many research and policy
questions in the field of regional sciences deal with the spatial development of regions.
Yet, it is a real challenge to construct an economic model that is capable of integrating
insights from behavioral studies and economic choices with social networks while
still operating in a heterogeneous spatial environment. Agent-based computational
economics (ACE) has proven successful in modelling various economic phenomena
while going beyond a representative maximizing agent with perfect information.
ACE is the study of economic processes, modelled as evolving systems of het-
erogeneous interacting agents with the use of computers and simulation techniques
(Tesfatsion and Judd 2006). Economic agents in agent-based models (ABMs) interact
with each other and the environment according to particular rules giving rise to emer-
gent macrophenomena (Farmer and Foley 2009). ABMs have been applied to study
various economic phenomena, for example financial markets (LeBaron 2001; Feng
et al. 2012), commodity markets (Gode and Sunder 1993; Graubner et al. 2011; Kir-
man and Vriend 2001), energy markets (Bunn and Oliveira 2003; Sun and Tesfatsion
2007), land markets (Chen et al. 2011; Filatova et al. 2011; Magliocca et al. 2011;
Filatova 2014; Parker 2014), systems of cities (Mansury and Gulyás 2007) as well
as agricultural economics questions (Balmann 1997; Berger 2001; Happe et al. 2006;
Troost and Berger 2014). Nolan et al. (2009) and Parker et al. (2012) review ACE
applications, in which spatial complexity matters. Irwin (2010) provides a detailed
analysis of the strengths and limitations of traditional economic modelling methods
and of ABMs. The agent-based method has been intensively applied by other disci-
plines including geography with its explicit treatment of space (Brown et al. 2005;
Robinson and Brown 2007; Crooks 2010), psychology with its rich representation
of individual decision-making (Janssen and Jager 1999, 2001; Jager et al. 2000) and
sociology with its explicit treatment of social networks (Carley 2009).
The ABM researchers have moved forward crossing the borders of single dis-
ciplines. Arthur (1993) opened the stage extending simple neoclassical models by
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advancing theoretical economic agents by means of computerized agents with learn-
ing algorithms, which were calibrated using human learning data from psychological
experiments. Lux (2009) presents an empirical stockmarket ACEmodel where traders
rely on the opinions of others when making investment decisions. Sun and Müller
(2013) study payments for ecosystem services using an empirical spatial ABM where
agents were influenced by opinions in their social network. Although significant
progresswasmade, there still exist knowledge gaps. Firstly, the above-mentioned stud-
ies rarely combine economic choices, behavioral insights, influence of social networks
and spatial aspects in one comprehensive model, which seems important to explore
regional economics dynamics (Batten 2001). Secondly, while the use of empirical data
in ABM is encouraged (Robinson et al. 2007), grounding behavioral rules (rather than
agents’ attributes) and interactions structure, e.g., social networks, of agents is still
scarce. Thirdly, studies rarely perform a systematic test on how relaxing the neoclas-
sical economic assumptions by including empirically observed behavior and social
networks affects the development of a region and its economic activities.
This paper aims tomake a step forward by addressing these three issues.We present
an applicationof a spatial economicABMtoexploremacrolevel changes at the regional
level driven by a spectrum of microfoundations under various climate change scenar-
ios. Microfoundations guiding agents’ behavior in our case vary from a pure rational
maximizer model to more behaviorally rich agents engaging in interactions within
social network elicited from a survey. The model is applied to study economic deci-
sions of farmers adapting to climate-induced drought risks in the Netherlands. Due to
climate change, droughts are expected to occur more frequently and to become more
severe in the future threatening crop production. Farmers need to adapt in order to
secure their income and reduce losses of the agricultural sector in the region. How-
ever, there is a lot of uncertainty about the impacts of droughts and climate change.
Studies have found that behavioral and social factors play the key role in farmers’
adaptive decision-making.
This paper is particularly interested in investigating the effects of including empir-
ical social networks and different behavioral rules guiding farmers’ choices under
drought risk on macroeconomic indicators (e.g., rate of adaptation, income of the
agricultural sector) in the southwest Netherlands. Specifically, we seek answers on
the following research questions: (1) What are the effects of microfoundations that
allow social interactions and non-rational behavior on the regional drought vulnera-
bility of the agricultural sector? (2) What is the impact of climate change on these
macrometrics? In this study, we combine these aspects in an agent-based model of
farmers’ decision-making under drought risk. The goal of this paper is to investigate
the effects of empirical social networks and different behavioral rules on farmers’
choices under drought risk and its impacts on several macroeconomic indicators such
as the rate of adaptation and income of the agricultural sector in the southwest of the
Netherlands.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some theoretical considera-
tions concerning farmers’ adaptive decision-making under risk inmore detail followed
by the description of the case-study area. Details on the method including our specific
ABM and the experimental design are presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 discusses the
results. Conclusions, limitations and future work are listed in Sect. 5.
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2 Droughts and the agricultural sector
2.1 Droughts and farmers’ decision-making
Water is a vital production factor for the agricultural sector. Droughts are a worldwide
problem and cause reduced crop quality, a loss of yield, increased production costs, a
loss of farm income and anxiety about food security and increasing food prices. With
climate change, the probability and severity of droughts are expected to increase in
many parts of the world. Adaptation to climate change induced droughts is inevitable,
and its success depends on the coordinated actions on governmental and individual
levels. In order for public adaptation to be successful, adaptation decision-making at
the farm level and its consequences for the performance of the agricultural sector at
large need to be well understood.
Economic models, and specifically mathematical programming models, are fre-
quently applied to investigate farmers’ technology adoption in light of climate change
(Janssen and Ittersum 2007; Gibbons and Ramsden 2008; Leclère et al. 2013). More
specifically, manymathematical programmingmodels exist that assess the interdepen-
dence between water availability, farm adaptation and regional agricultural income
(Toft and O’Hanlon 1979; Benli and Kodal 2003; Maneta et al. 2009; Cortignani
and Severini 2009; García-Vila and Fereres 2012; Connor et al. 2012; Graveline et al.
2014). In thesemodels, a farmer’s adaptive behavior depends on theflexibility to substi-
tute between production factors and techniques formalized in the resource constraints
and a farmer’s decision rules stemming fromexpected utility theory.Mathematical pro-
gramming studies mostly use some sort of aggregation employing the homogeneity
assumption to avoid unmanageable model sizes and because of limited data availabil-
ity. This causes aggregation bias, overspecialization and a weak goodness of fit of the
model results on a regional level (Troost and Berger 2014). Even though many clever
methods have been developed to address farmers’ adaptive decision-making under
uncertainty using mathematical programming models, it becomes more widely recog-
nized that the representation of adaptive decision-making according to EU Theory is
limited due to the underlying assumptions on rational actors and the absence of social
interactions.
There is, for example, ample evidence that farmers’ actual and planned decisions
are guided by farmers’ risk perceptions (Gbetibouo 2009; Deressa et al. 2011; Man-
dleni and Anim 2011; Wheeler et al. 2013; van Duinen et al. 2014b). Recent studies
show that these risk perceptions deviate from the actual objective drought risk due
to heterogeneity in their personal circumstances and personality traits. It shows, for
example, that farmers are guided by the availability heuristic in their risk judgements;
the more often farmers have experienced financial damage due to drought events the
greater their risk perception (Tang et al. 2013; van Duinen et al. 2014a). Moreover,
there is evidence that several subjective coping factors influence farmers’ evaluation
of adaptive strategies, such as perceived self-efficacy, perceived adaptation costs and
perceived adaptation efficacy (Dang et al. 2014; van Duinen et al. 2014b; Gebrehiwot
and van der Veen 2015).
Furthermore, there is empirical and experimental evidence showing that individuals
do not take decisions under risk in isolation, but rather rely on social interactions
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within networks (Bougheas et al. 2013; Wossen et al. 2013). In the agricultural sector,
informal peer networks are important channels for interactions. Empirical research
shows that social peer influence is a significant variable in farmers’ risk perceptions and
adaptive behavior (Barnes et al. 2013; Tang et al. 2013; Dang et al. 2014). Barnes et al.
(2013) show, for example, that the frequent use of social networks increases farmers’
perceptions of climate change risks. Tang et al. (2013) found a positive relationship
between connectedness to a social network with knowledge on water scarcity and a
farmer’s risk perception. Informal communications among peers provide references
to validate one’s risk perception and decision against the social norm.
The importance of social interactions in individual decision-making under risk and
their contribution to the explanation of aggregate phenomena has been recognized
in macroeconomics (Manski 2000; Brock and Durlauf 2005; Durlauf and Ioannides
2010). Based on new information from peers, agents learn about risks and adaptation
options, changing their perceived adaptive capacity, and likely resulting in behavioral
change (Kasperson et al. 1988). Interaction among heterogeneous agents regarding
risks and adaptation optionsmay result in some actions being simultaneously perceived
as adaptive or maladaptive. Opinions and experiences of others impact individual
decisions regarding adaptation giving rise to social reinforcement of certain trends in
macrodynamics. Studies have shown that including social interactions may result in
macrodynamics that differ significantly from macro-outcomes under the assumption
of rational actors (Janssen et al. 2000).
From this we learn that psychological and social factors affect farmers’ evalua-
tion and ranking of adaptation alternatives and that they do not form perfect drought
risk judgements based on probabilities and damages. Instead their expectations,
preferences and decisions are likely to be biased and dynamic. Climate adaptation
research calls for the need to explore the effects of social networks, perceptions
and behavioral changes in order to understand the complex relationships and feed-
backs between individual decision-making under risk at the microlevel, interactions
through social networks at the mesolevel and aggregate- scale changes in vulnerabil-
ity at the macrolevel. ABM is a useful method for examining the adaptive behavior
of heterogeneous farmers whose past decisions impact future expectations. It allows
the exploration of the interplay between individual decisions, social interactions and
macroscale indicators.
Technology adoption of the agricultural sector has been studied using ABMs; see,
for example, Schreinemachers et al. (2009, 2010) and Troost and Berger (2014).
Several ABMs have been applied to studywater availability and farm decision-making
issues specifically (Berger 2001; Asseng et al. 2010; van Oel et al. 2010, 2012; Berger
and Troost 2014). However, they mainly focused on the effects of heterogeneity and
static behavioral preferences on model outcomes. Even though social networks are
identified as important in studying agricultural technology adoption, few modelling
studies include social network effects on individual decision-making and aggregate
outcomes using empirical data. Manson et al. (2014) is to our knowledge the only
available study including empirical social networks in the analysis of agricultural
technology adoption. They show that social networks are important in the adoption
of multifunctional agriculture and that their influence depends on their configuration.
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Table 1 Damage to agriculture
(Ministerie van Economische
Zaken Landbouw en Innovatie
2011)
Degree of drought Frequency Damage
(million euros)
Dry year 1/10 700
Extreme dry year 1/100 1800
Annual expected value 350
Current study contributes to this very scarce literature by examining the role of social
networks on agricultural technology adoption in a risk context.
2.2 Case-study area
Even though the Netherlands is a ‘wet’ country with a maritime climate, it is likely
that droughts will occur more frequently and will become more severe due to climate
change. The initiation of the Deltaprogram, a national program with among other
things the aim to secure the freshwater supply in the long run, shows that the Dutch
government acknowledges the significance of future climate-induced drought prob-
lems (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 2010). First estimates within the scope of
this program indicate that the economic loss to the Dutch agricultural sector may reach
700 million e in a ‘dry year’ with a precipitation deficiency of more than 220mm in
summer (frequency of 1/10years) (see Table 1). In an ‘extreme dry year’ with a precip-
itation deficiency of over 360mm in summer (frequency of 1/100years), the economic
loss to the agricultural sector may reach 1800 millione. This is equal to 0.1 and 0.3%
of GDP, respectively. Due to climate change and socioeconomic developments, these
damages might increase fivefold in 2050, meaning that the agricultural sector will
face a loss of 700 million e once every 2years (Ministerie van Economische Zaken
Landbouw en Innovatie 2011).
The Netherlands’ southwest is a particularly vulnerable agricultural area. Histor-
ically, it is a transition area between fresh and salt water, causing groundwater and
surface water resources to contain high chloride concentrations in many places. A dis-
tinction can be made between areas with and areas without access to an external water
supply (see Fig. 1). Areas without an external water supply are dependent on natural
systems, whereas areas with an external water supply have access to freshwater from
lakes, rivers or pipelines (see Table 2).
Agriculture inWalcheren,Noord-Beveland and a large part of Zuid-Beveland exclu-
sively depends on precipitation and fresh groundwater for its water supply. In these
areas, excessive precipitation infiltrates the ground, forming a thin freshwater lens in
the crops’ root zone. Under dry circumstances, the freshwater lenses disappear causing
crop damage due to excessive dry and salty conditions. The proper functioning of the
natural system is dependent on precipitation and evaporation. Farmers located in areas
dependent on the natural system may adapt to drought circumstances by investing in
freshwater basins in combination with irrigation equipment.
Goeree-Overflakkee and Tholen gained access to an external freshwater supply
in 1970, when large compartment dams were constructed to protect the area from
flooding, which created large freshwater lakes. Nowadays, water boards primarily
123
R. van Duinen et al.
Fig. 1 Location of study area
Table 2 Freshwater supply in the Netherlands’ southwest
System Source of water supply Geographical location
No external water supply Natural system (i.e., only
precipitation)
Walcheren, Noord-Beveland,
part of Zuid-Beveland
External water supply Natural system+water
supply from lakes and rivers
Goeree-Overflakkee, Tholen,
Zeeuws-Vlaanderen
Natural system+water
supply through pipeline
Part of Zuid-Beveland
use freshwater from these basins to flush the water system to contain salt concen-
trations in both the ground and surface water resources. The freshwater availability
in these basins depends on river discharge. During droughts, river discharge declines
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reducing the availability of external water for flushing the system, irrigation and water
supply to other sectors. In extreme dry situations, water boards may intervene by pro-
hibiting irrigation. Zeeuws-Vlaanderen has historical access to freshwater from the
regional water system in Belgium. On-farm water supply through pipelines is only
available on Zuid-Beveland. In normal years with sufficient precipitation, this sys-
tem provides an ample water supply. In dry years, however, the pipeline capacity is
insufficient. Farmers located in areas dependent on the natural system in combina-
tion with an external water supply may adapt by investing in irrigation equipment
only.
The total agricultural area in the southwest Netherlands is approximately 13,800ha,
cultivated by 3500 farmers. The land use across subareas is similar. Arable farming
is the main land use in all areas, with potatoes, sugar beet and grain being the most
cultivated crops (see Fig. 2). This is followed by pasture and fodder crops, mainly
grass and corn. Horticulture is present in all areas. InGoeree-Overflakkee, themajority
of the horticulture land is dedicated to flower bulbs. In Zuid-Beveland, 92% of the
horticulture land consists of fruit trees. In the other areas, it is a mix of flower bulbs,
fruit trees and vegetables.
3 Methods
3.1 Agent-based model: basic structure
Building upon the experience of agricultural ABMs, we design an agent-based SAGA
model (social networks in agricultural adaptation to climate change) to explore how
farmers’ choices under drought risk are affected by their social network and alternative
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Fig. 3 Conceptual model
behavioral rules. SAGA advances the previous efforts by incorporating empirical data
not only for the environment in which agents operate, but also for social networks
through which agents interact. We are particularly interested in how farmers’ adap-
tive behavior is amplified by social interactions and impacts the vulnerability of the
agricultural sector. Therefore, we analyze the effect of climate scenarios on regional
agricultural income, the adaptation rate of irrigation technologies and water demand
as mediated by income generation through agricultural production and interactions in
social networks. The conceptual model of SAGA is shown in Fig. 3. Following the
ABM research tradition, an ODD+D model description is available in the electronic
supplement of the paper (Grimm et al. 2006, 2010; Müller et al. 2013).
Farm agents operate in an environment consisting of the biophysical and socioe-
conomic sphere. Their decisions depend on and affect both of these environments.
The biophysical environment consists of four components. Water availability is an
exogenous model driver depending on drought conditions and the climate change
scenario. We analyze two climate scenarios: 1. the current climate and 2. a climate
change scenario. The climate change scenario affects the frequency and severity of
drought events. Crop production is dependent on the water availability and, therefore,
indirectly on the drought conditions and climate change scenario. Crops are produced
on fields, and in the model, each field agent represents one cell of 1 hectare in a grid.
Together, they define the geographical boundaries of the model. The four most impor-
tant fields’ state variables are the owner, the cultivated crop, the access to an external
water supply and the applied irrigation technique. Depending on farmers’ decisions,
field agents may change from no irrigation to irrigation.
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The socioeconomic environment consists of three components. Farm agents are at
the core of the model; they own fields on which they cultivate crops and take decisions
on the investment in irrigation equipment. Their income depends on the crop pro-
duction in a specific year and, therefore, on the water availability and meteorological
conditions. Farmers sell the crop yield on the crop market. In turn for their crops, they
receive revenue, depending on the crop price. We consider the crop market as exoge-
nous because input and output markets are beyond the scope of this regional study.
Farmers take decisions depending on their drought risk experience and information
from their social network. Farmers are connected to other farmers through social ties,
and a farmers’ social network is the collection of his social ties. Due to interactions
within the network, information on the share of technology adopters in a social net-
work is spread and is consequently affecting farmer’s decisions. On the other hand,
a farmer gives input to this network through its behavior, influencing the decision-
making of others. Depending on farmers’ decision-making strategy, they use drought
risk experience and information from their social networks to decide whether to invest
in irrigation equipment. This decision is crop dependent as some crops are more sen-
sitive to droughts and therefore more profitable to irrigate. Farmers located in areas
without an external water supply need to invest in additional equipment to store water,
such as freshwater basins. Therefore, they are confronted with higher investment costs
than farmers who are located in areas with an external water supply. Farmers’ deci-
sions collectively determine the performance of the regional agricultural sector at the
macrolevel. In the model, the performance is measured through three indicators: the
rate of adaptation diffusion, change in regional income and collective water demand.
Simulations are performed following a 10-day cycle to determine crop production;
moreover, we use a yearly cycle for decisions on irrigation investments. Within each
year, a sequence of three processes takes place: meteorological changes, crop produc-
tion and farm decision-making. In the next section, the model implementation of each
of these processes is discussed in more detail. The model is programmed in Netlogo
5.1.0 (Wilensky 1999).
3.2 Climate change scenarios
During the growing season (April–September), every 10-day crops are exposed to
different climate conditions reflected in the ratio between actual evaporation (Eact)
and potential evaporation (Epot), and these are the model’s input parameters. We
analyze two scenarios: the current climate and a potential climate change scenario
in 2100. The evaporation data are obtained from Mens et al. (under review). They
estimated a 1000-year time series for the average potential and actual evaporation for
the west Netherlands in the current climate scenario and a potential climate change
scenario using a simple hydrological water balance model called RAM. The definition
of the climate change scenario is based on the KNMI’06 climate change scenario,1
W+2100, representing a change in average summer precipitation of −26% (coastal
1 KNMI is the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute. It develops climate change scenario closely aligned
with IPCC scenarios and specified for the Dutch situation.
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areas) and an average change in temperature of+4 ◦C (Van den Hurk et al. 2006). The
data on average actual and potential evaporation are uploaded to the SAGA model as
a csv-file at initialization depending on the choice of a climate scenario. To account
for uncertainty in climate variability each model run, the model chooses randomly a
different starting date out of the 1000-year time series.
3.3 Crop production
To estimate agricultural yield loss, we use an agro-economic model called AGRICOM
(Mulder and Veldhuizen 2014). Based on the ratio between actual and potential evap-
oration, AGRICOM calculates damage fractions for each type of crop. The damage
fraction is the share of the potential crop yield that is lost due to drought, which is
a standard approach to estimate agricultural damages. A crop’s drought sensitivity
depends on its growth stage; therefore, the damage functions change every 10days,
depending on the timing within the seasonal cycle. The damage fraction determines
the survival fraction for the next time step, taking into account the part of the crop
that is lost due to drought in previous periods. At the end of the year, the total damage
fraction is calculated as the product of the remaining yield and the survival fraction
summed over the year. This fraction is then multiplied by the potential crop yield to
obtain the actual crop yield in kg/ha. The potential crop yield depends on the potential
evaporation in a specific year. A detailed description of the crop damage model in the
ODD+D description is available as online resource.
3.4 The farm agent
3.4.1 Economic decision model
At the end of the year, a farmer observes his potential and actual yield where the latter
depends on whether there was loss from droughts or not in a particular year. Actual
yield is estimated in SAGA for each location and each farmer based on the damage
functions (coded in SAGA based on the calculations from the AGRICOMmodel) and
farmers’ adaptation choices. Based on this information, the agent calculates his actual
gross margin (Yt ) and potential gross margin (Y ∗t ). Following the standard economic
approach, the actual gross margin is calculated as the sum over his actual yield Yldnt
multiplied with the related crop price pn minus the production costs cn ; see Eq. 1.
Yt =
n∑
i=1
(
Yldnt · pn
) − cn (1)
The potential gross margin is calculated in the same way. Farmers observe their poten-
tial and actual crop production and consecutively estimate their income loss (Lt ) based
on potential income (Y ∗t ) and actual income (Yt ) at the end of the growing season; see
Eq. 2.
Lt = Y ∗t − Yt (2)
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Agent-based literature offers various approaches to formalize bounded rationality. One
of the methods is to assume myopic agents, agents who have imperfect information
and only look backwards for information. Updating farmers’ future expectations based
on observed incomes from previous years is a common approach in the agricultural
economics literature (Aurbacher et al. 2013). Thus, expectation formation in the cur-
rent version of the SAGA model is implemented using a backward-looking algorithm
assuming that farmers learn from past experiences.
For the incomeexpectation formation, SAGAimplements an exponential smoothen-
ing algorithm, in which negative experiences further away in the past count less than
recent experiences as people tend to forget events further in the past; see Eq. 3. The
weight a farmer attaches to more distant years depends on the discounting factor
α. The discount factor is the weight a farmer attaches to previous years to account
for the fact that farmers forget; events further away in the past get less weight than
recent events. The discount factor alpha is constant over time. An exploration of other
expectation formation algorithms including forward-looking expectations could be a
valuable extension of the model.
Yˆt0+1 = (1 − α) Yt + αYˆt (3)
Besides forming income predictions with the current farm plan and technology, farm-
ers form expectations about their income if they would adopt irrigation technology.
Farmers re-estimate Eqs. 1–3, assuming they apply irrigation. In this economic deci-
sion model, farm agents have perfect information about the costs and benefits of
adopting the technology. On the one hand, agents take into account that adaptation
through the investment in irrigation technology will increase the actual gross margin
in dry situations as irrigation will increase the water availability and avoid drought-
induced income loss; see Eq. 2. We assume an irrigation efficiency of 80%, as part of
the irrigation water does not reach the crop’s root zone due to evaporation or runoff.
On the other hand, agent calculates the extra production costs imposed by irrigation.
The irrigation costs of a specific crop consist of variable costs including labor costs,
energy costs, charges, and fixed costs. The variable costs are dependent on the pre-
dicted water use in mm and water price. The data on the cost parameters come from
the AGRICOM model. These values are the average estimates of ground water and
surface water irrigation technology, as we do not distinguish between these irrigation
types. The fixed costs per ha depend on the capital recovery factor (CRF), the invest-
ment costs and maintenance and insurance costs. The CRF is the yearly annuity of an
investment given a specific interest rate for capital and a time horizon. It takes a single
payment and spreads it into a uniform series over N later periods. If the predicted
crop income with irrigation is higher than the predicted income with no irrigation, a
farmer decides to irrigate the crop. If the expected incomewith irrigation is higher than
the income under the current farm plan, farmers will adopt the irrigation technology.
See ‘Appendix 1’ for a decision tree of the economic decision model. When farmers
decide to invest in irrigation of a particular crop, the field status in the ABM changes
to ‘irrigated.’
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Fig. 4 The Consumat strategies
3.4.2 Individual decision-making and social interactions
Whilemaximization under the assumption of perfect informationmight be an attractive
way to conceptualize farmers’ behavior, there is a lot of empirical evidence showing
that economic choices under risk deviate from this model. Moreover, when faced with
a decision under uncertainty people often rely on the opinion of their peers.We choose
the ‘Consumat’ approach as a theoretical framework to conceptualize deviations from
perfect maximization (Jager 2000). The Consumat approach has been developed as a
framework that allows for the modelling of different decisional strategies as a function
of satisfaction and uncertainty. It thus allows for agents to switch between decision
strategies that differ concerning social orientation and cognitive effort. The key deci-
sional strategies are repetition, imitation, deliberation and social comparison, as shown
in Fig. 4 (Jager 2000; Janssen and Jager 2001; Jager and Janssen 2012).
When an agent is satisfied and certain, it will repeat its previous behavior. This
cognitive simple strategy reflects habitual behavior. Imitation is performed when the
agent is satisfied but uncertain. In this simple social strategy, the agent will copy
the behavior of another (similar and connected) other agent. Social comparison is per-
formed when an agent is uncertain and not satisfied. This more cognitively demanding
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strategy involves the scanning of other agents’ behaviors and estimating the outcomes
for copying that behavior. Deliberation finally is a cognitive demanding strategy per-
formed when an agent is not satisfied and certain. Deliberation involves the evaluation
of all possible behavioral options and thus resembles optimizing behavior.
The Consumat approach allows for integrating different theoretical concepts from
social sciences, such as needs, decision strategies, cognition and social interaction
into a framework for agent-based modelling. The four decisional strategies are basic
orientations of the decision-making process, and depending on themodelling demands,
it is possible to developdifferent implementations of these strategies, e.g., timehorizon,
time-discounting functions, opinion-change functions, effects of expertise and the like,
thus addressing a much wider spectrum of decisional strategies.
In comparison with many approaches that use, e.g., optimization with imperfect
information, or bounded rationality, the Consumat approach is capable of addressing
the switching between different decision strategies in a more realistic manner. For
example, the Consumat approach allows for modelling agents performing habitual
behavior, and when the outcomes of this habit are not satisfactory anymore, or the
agent gets uncertain, it may search for alternative behavior using the other decision
strategies. When this new behavior is satisfactory, and the agent is certain, a new habit
may emerge. These processes are critical in understanding the dynamics of innovation
diffusion.
There are several ABMs that employ the Consumat approach. In some studies,
the allocation of the four Consumat decision-making strategies is forced upon the
model and remains static over model runs (Sopha et al. 2013). Alternatively, the
choice of decision-making strategy is endogenous and dynamic depending on the
evolution of an agent’s satisfaction and uncertainty over time (Speelman 2014; Natal-
ini and Bravo 2014; Miahle et al. 2012). In the SAGA model, the assignment of
a decision-making strategy of an economic agent evolves over time, depending on
his level of income satisfaction and uncertainty. Uncertainty and level of income
satisfaction change depending on the weather, crop production and income. There-
fore, agents may switch between decision-making strategies at a later point in time.
To make agents’ cognitive strategy dependent on their experience in SAGA, we
define income satisfaction and uncertainty within the model as well as the income
aspiration level and uncertainty tolerance thresholds. Both are heterogeneous across
agents.
Income satisfaction (S) is defined as the ratio between a farmer’s current income
Yt and his potential income Y t∗; see Eq. 4. The income aspiration level, the level
of income that agents aspire in order to be satisfied, is heterogeneous across agents.
We assume that the income aspiration level is normally distributed across the agents,
with N (0.5, 0.17).2 The level of income satisfaction determines a farmers’ cognitive
effort to make decisions. Satisfied farmers rely on decision-making strategies that do
not require a lot of cognitive effort, for example repetition or imitation. Unsatisfied
2 In a sensitivity analyses, we explored the sensitivity of the model results to an alternative distribution.
Implementing a uniform distribution U (0, 1) did not have any significant effects on the model results.
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farmers, however, will make a lot of cognitive effort to make a decision that will make
him better-off in the future, for example through deliberation or social comparison.
St = Yt
Y ∗t
(4)
Decision-making under risk is operationalized in the Consumat model as a farmers’
level of uncertainty concerning his income given the probabilistic nature of drought
events and the adoption of irrigation technology. A farmer’s uncertainty level, or
risk awareness, is defined as the ratio between a farmer’s current income Yt and his
predicted income Yˆt ; see Eq. 5.
UTt = 1 − Yt
Yˆt
, for UTt > 0 (5)
We assume that the uncertainty threshold is normally distributed across the agents,
with N (0.5, 0.17) (see footnote 2).A farmer’s uncertainty determineswhether a farmer
engages in social interactions to make an informed decision. Agents who are uncertain
are more likely to engage in strategies involving social interactions. Farmers, who are
certain, are unlikely to engage in social interactions to inform their decision-making
and instead rely on their own experience.
Based on a farmer’s uncertainty, income satisfaction, income aspiration level and
uncertainty threshold he will engage in one of the four Consumat decision strategies:
repetition, imitation, deliberation or social comparison. When agents are satisfied and
certain, they will simply repeat their behavior next year (repetition). This implies that
when the climate is stable, farmers are not likely to change their behavior. However,
when droughts occur farmers are likely to face crop damage and income changing
their level of income satisfactions and uncertainty. Depending on a farmer’s income
aspiration level and uncertainty threshold, he will rely on another decision-making
strategy in the next year. Unsatisfied but certain agents rely on deliberation. This
decision strategy is an equivalent of the ‘economic’ strategy described in Sect. 3.4.1
inwhich agents have perfect information, systematically compare decision alternatives
and make optimal choices and is implemented in exactly the same way. This model
setup allows us to systematically compare an individual optimization strategy with
individual choices based on heuristics (repetition) as well as with economic choices
influenced through the social network.
Two decision strategies consider interactions within social networks. Uncertain
agents will base their decisions on the behavior of others, for example through social
comparison or imitation. In the case of imitation, an agent evaluates the behavior
performed by its strong links. A strong link joins peers who have similar farm char-
acteristics and are located nearby. The behavior of a particular share of strong links is
imitated.
Finally, an agent who relies on social comparison considers the behavior performed
by both its weak and strong links and its whole social network. Weak links join less
similar andmore distant farmers than strong links. The behavior of a particular share of
farmers within his network is adopted. This decision strategy requires more cognitive
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effort than imitation. See ‘Appendix 1 and Appendix 2’ for the decision trees per
Consumat strategy.
3.4.3 The data on microfoundations of agents’ behavior
Agent parameterization To create an empirically based agent population, the farm
agent attributes are calibrated based on survey data. During January and February
2013, a survey based on a potential sample of 1474 members of a Dutch agricul-
tural organization (the LTO) was conducted to elicit farmers’ drought risk awareness,
adaptive behavior and socioeconomic characteristics. TNS-NIPO, a Dutch organi-
zation specializing in data collection on the basis of questionnaires, supported the
survey design, web application, communication with respondents and database man-
agement. The survey was pretested in 12 interviews with farmers, in consultation with
Scheldestromen (the local water board) and LTO. To stimulate responses, at least one
reminder was sent out and people were offered a chance to win a lottery prize. In total,
142 responses (9.3%) were received. In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate
their farm size and cropping pattern. To randomly generate an agent population based
on this sample in SAGA, we followed Berger and Schreinemachers (2012), who use
Monte Carlo techniques. In line with their approach, we determined empirical cumu-
lative frequency distributions for the cultivated area of 10 crops. These functions are
then used to randomly allocate an area of a specific crop to an agent.
Adaptation choices To elicit farmers’ adaptive behavior in the survey, we have consid-
ered adaptation measures fitting the geographical, economic and institutional context
of the southwest of the Netherlands. The drought adaptation strategies to be included
in the survey were selected in three stages: (1) selection based on the biophysical con-
ditions and secondary literature review; (2) external validation through interviewswith
experts; and (3) fine-tuning based on the feedback from farmers. Firstly, we left out
farm adaptation strategies not directly related to drought risk, such as diversification
of farm activities, the selling/buying of land and the relocation of farms. Tolk (2012)
overviewed all relevant adaptation measures to drought and salinity in the southwest
of the Netherlands.
From this overview, we shortlisted several measures on the basis of a single crite-
rion: the ability of farmers to implement the adaptation measure independently from
institutions such as agricultural cooperatives and regional/local governments. Adapta-
tionmeasures concerning spatial planning, water pricing and large-scale infrastructure
have therefore not been included in the analysis. Secondly, the set of adaptation strate-
gieswas very carefully set up and externally validated.We reviewed the set ofmeasures
and consulted experts with local knowledge. The experts included water management
specialists from the local water board and agricultural specialists from organizations
in the Netherlands. Thirdly, we tested the survey and the set of adaptation strategies in
several in-depth interviews with farmers, resulting in 12 adaptation measures for the
final survey; see ‘Appendix 3.’
However, at this stage we have implemented only two adaptation options in the
model: irrigation and freshwater storage in basins. For farmers in areas with an exter-
nal water supply it suffices to invest in irrigation, whereas farmers located in areas
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Table 3 Model experiments
No. Behavioral rules Climate scenario Social influence
Exp1 Optimization Current climate None
Exp2 Optimization WP2100 None
Exp3 Consumat Current climate Yes
Exp4 Consumat WP2100 Yes
without an external water supply have to invest in an additional freshwater basin for
their water supply increasing their investment costs. Note, the survey data allows us to
test 12 options. Understanding the diffusion of various adaptation options under var-
ious behavioral assumptions (perfect maximizers vs. Consumat farmers with social
interactions) for different climate change scenarios is a subject to future work.
Social network To identify farmers’ social networks, we relied on the homophily
principle in which the degree of similarity structures one’s social network (McPher-
son et al. 2001). The survey contained a question to identify a farmer’s number of
connections: A respondent had to mention the 5 most important peers with whom he
interacts on drought issues followed by two questions to elicit an agent’s similarity to
the most important peers within his social network based on distance and farm type.
To calibrate the social network in the SAGAmodel, we followed a similar approach as
the Monte Carlo techniques to calibrate farm size and cropping pattern. In the model,
farmers who are nearby and who have similar farm types have a higher chance to form
a social tie. Social ties that are very similar are defined as strong links, and connections
that are less similar are labelled weak links.
4 Results
4.1 Experiment setup
Wemodelled farmers’ adaptive decision-making under different climate and behavior
scenarios (Table 3) to answer our research questions. A comparison of Exp1 and Exp2
to Exp3 and Exp4 sheds light on the differences in regional dynamics depending on the
assumptions about economic agents’microfoundations.By contrastingExp1 andExp3
with Exp2 and Exp4, one can infer the differences economic systems may experience
when adapting to natural hazard risks under various climate change scenarios and
behavioral microfoundations. Zooming into the temporal patterns of the distribution
of behavioral strategies in Exp3 and Exp4 allows us to judge the potential factors
explaining the dynamics behind macrometrics. Each scenario is run for 30years 30
times to account for a random seed effect.
4.2 Macrometrics of interest
To explore the effects of various microfoundations on the regional dynamics in our
case-study application, the SAGA model traces several macrometrics. The results
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Fig. 5 Share of adopters (Exp1, Exp2, Exp3, Exp4)
of the 4 SAGA experiments for economic, environmental and social measures on the
regional level are presented below. Eachmacrometric for each experiment is presented
as an average over 30 runs to control for the random seed effect. Finally, our ACE
model allows recording all agents’ decisions and considerations on individual level
in csv-files. This allows one to look at the disaggregated dynamics and interactions
driving averaged cumulative numbers and macrophenomena. Section 5 will discuss
the outcomes.
Rate of adopters The rate of adopters gives insight in the dynamics of the adaptation
process (see Fig. 5). The rate of adopters is measured as the share of farm agents who
adopts irrigation on at least one of his fields.
Change in regional agricultural income Toget insight in the aggregate-scale change in
the drought vulnerability of the agricultural sector, we measure the change in regional
income (see Figs. 6 and 7). Regional agricultural income is measured as the sum of
individual income over the whole population.
Cumulative water demand Finally, wemonitor the cumulative water demand of farm-
ers who are located in areas with an external water supply (see Figs. 8, 9). The
cumulative water demand is determined by two factors: the meteorological condi-
tions and the irrigated area; the extent of the application of irrigation.
Behavioral strategies Wealsomeasure the share of farmers’ population employing the
maximization strategy or one of the other three Consumat strategies in Experiments
3 and 4 (see Fig. 10). This allows to clarify the role of social networks in order to
explain the adoption patterns observed in Fig. 5. Note that all farmers are maximizers
in Experiments 1 and 2.
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Fig. 7 Regional agricultural income under climate change (Exp2 and Exp4)
5 Discussion
5.1 Economic optimizers, heuristics-based farmers and impacts of social
network
One of the primary questions we want to explore here is to understand how aggregated
economic, social and environmental measures vary with different microfoundations
at the individual agent level. For this purpose, we compare the macrodynamics in the
region assuming that farmers agents behave as economicmaximizing (Exp1 and Exp2,
Table 3) versus heuristic-based agents potentially affected by their social network
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Fig. 9 Cumulative water demand under climate change (Exp2 and Exp4)
(Exp3 and Exp4, Table 3). In both cases, the agents’ population is parameterized
using survey data, including data on social networks.
5.1.1 Share of adopters
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the share of adopters for the two climate scenarios
assuming that farmers rely on rational economic decision-making (Exp1 and Exp2).
Both in the current climate and under climate change nearly all farmers (98%) adopt
irrigation on at least one of their fields as an adaptation option to tackle the adverse
effects of droughts. We observe this dynamics because rational farmers’ expected
benefits of irrigation do not compensate the expected adaptation costs in the early
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Fig. 10 Dynamics of Consumat strategies in two climate scenarios (Exp3 and Exp4)
periods due to relatively mild droughts, and consequently losses. At the same time,
as soon as expected losses due to droughts grow and exceed benefits of adaptation,
the transition to an almost complete adoption of the drought adaptation technologies
happens quite abruptly. Note that this ‘nearly one shot’ transition happens in the
population of farmers that are heterogeneous in the size of their land, cropping patterns
and income. Yet, this is rarely a pattern one observes in the real world (Rogers 2003).
Thus, we explore the dynamics of the share of adopters when farmers behave
according to the Consumat decision-making strategies, also for two climate scenarios
(Exp3 and Exp4, Fig. 5). So, the adoption rate in the Consumat scenarios with the
optimization scenarios shows that the average share of adopters follows a very different
path over time for both climate scenarios. Specifically, it shows that the adoption
process takes several years and is not an abrupt transition. The functioning of social
networks is the key to explain this gradual process. In the Consumat scenarios (Exp3
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and Exp4), a share of the farmers relies on decision-making strategies (imitation and
social comparison) that involve social interactions through their social networks. Once
these farmers observe that the majority of their weak or strong links have adopted,
they will also decide to adopt. This process takes time, as the adoption process should
be start up by farm agents who rely on deliberation (economic optimization). In order
to explain the differences in the adoption patterns of the Consumat scenarios across
climate scenarios, Sect. 5.3 explains more about the dynamics of switching between
the behavioral strategies and the consequences for the evolvement of the adoption rate.
5.1.2 Dynamics of the regional agricultural income
Wemonitor the aggregate-scale effects of the different adaptation pathways presented
in Fig. 5 on regional income and cumulative water demand. Figure 6 presents the
regional income for both the optimization and Consumat scenario in the current cli-
mate (Exp1 and Exp3). In the current climate scenario, the average regional income
stays more or less constant over time. However, the confidence intervals show that the
variation in income is decreasing over time, due to the adoption of irrigation technol-
ogy. These results have two implications. Firstly, due to irrigation farmers observe less
income loss in the case of dry conditions. Secondly, in good years in which dry con-
ditions are absent the additional income generated with irrigation do not compensate
the involved irrigation cost resulting in lower income peaks.
Comparing the optimization scenario with the Consumat scenario shows that the
difference in average regional income between these two scenarios is small. The Con-
sumat scenario, in which agent relies partly on their social networks, shows a slightly
lower income between 7 and 20year. The average regional income in this period is
2.3% lower, and the 95% confidence interval is larger with the lower endpoint being
18.5% lower and the upper endpoint being 6.7% higher on average. The lower end-
point is the result of the slow adoption process in this phase of the scenario. Due to
the slow adoption, a large share of the farmers is still exposed to drought conditions
and face more income loss. However, after 30years the differences in income mostly
vanish.
Under the current model assumptions, the income trends in Fig. 6 reveal that even
if there is only a small share of economic agents who behave as rational optimizers,
a population as a whole still may produce results that are close to model with only
maximizing agents. In other words, it is enough to have just a small proportion of
perfect maximizers within a population of heuristics-based agents who have an ability
to imitate the best practice in their social network to achieve a near-optimum state of
the regional economy in the long run.
The advantage of this result is twofold. Firstly, this may actually appear quite in
harmony with the reality: when there are few leaders who perform careful and costly
analysis and others follow their choice if they observe a successful performance. At
the same time, it implies that in some circumstances the economic model with its
assumptions of rational perfectly informed agents would predict an economic trend
that a real economy follows despite its misrepresentation of the actual heuristics-based
behavior. Yet, this is validwhen social interactions are present. Secondly and reversely,
there is no need to have an assumption of perfect information as in some circumstances
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Fig. 11 Farm-level income of three Consumat farmers under climate change (Exp4)
less computationally heavy agents deliver aggregated results that are close to the
optimum on the macrolevel by just copying a few ‘intelligent’ agents. Figure 11
shows income trend of a farmer who successfully adapts to drought, a farmer who
does not adapt and an ‘average farmer’ in the Consumat with climate change scenario
(Exp4). The ‘average farmer’ is the representative for the whole population and is
simply the average income trend of all farmers. The other two represented farmers
have been selected based on their similarity, so they are located in the same area, have
a similar cropping pattern and have a similar farm size. However, due to heterogeneity
of behavioral properties they make different choices. One of them adopts, resulting
in a considerable income increase, and the other one is a laggard and does not adopt.
Farmers’ uncertainty thresholds, aspiration levels, social network characteristics and
expectations are important behavioral characteristics that determine their adaptive
behavior. Farmerswho rely on deliberation or farmerswho have strong social networks
that they use for their decisions have the highest chance to be successful.
This figure also shows that interpreting model results based on an average or repre-
sentative agent may be misleading, especially if farmers are not behaving in a rational
way. The aggregate results show that with climate change the regional income is
increasing under the current model assumptions; however, if all farmers would be able
to adapt, income might be even higher. This makes it an important task to identify
the farmers who are not able to adapt under climate change and to think about policy
instruments on how to influence these farmers.
5.1.3 Water demand
The cumulative water demand shows howmuch water farmers demand from the water
system, and this includes only farmers who are located in areas with access to an exter-
nal water supply as farmers who are located in areas without an access to an external
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water supply do not have access to these resources. Figure 8 shows the cumulative
water demand in the current climate; Fig. 9 shows the cumulative water demand under
climate change.Due to the adoption of irrigation, thewater demand increases over time
and is dependent on the irrigated area. The variability depends on the meteorological
conditions in a specific year. In a dry year, the cumulative water demand peaks.
In the optimization scenarios, the cumulative water demand is higher than in the
Consumat scenarios. In the current climate with optimizing behavior (Exp1), the
average water demand is 46% higher than in the current climate with Consumat
behavior (Exp3). Under climate change, the average difference in cumulative water
demand between Consumat behavior and optimizing behavior is 13% (Exp2 and
Exp4). The increase in cumulative water demand in the case of optimizing behavior
can be explained by the fact that in the Consumat scenarios the share of adopters is
lower than in the optimization scenarios and fewer farmers adopt irrigation resulting
in a smaller irrigated area and consequently in a lower water demand. Thus, there is
a significant qualitative difference in the trend of cumulative water demand. From a
water demand point of view, Consumat farmers deliver more resilient outcomes in the
face of deceasing water availability.
5.2 Adaptation to climate change under various behavioral assumptions
Due to effects of climate change on droughts, the average regional income is 50
million euro lower in the first years of the simulation compared to the current climate
and even becomes negative in some of the experiments (Figs. 6, 7). Therefore, the
majority of farmers adopt irrigation techniques quickly in this climate scenario. In
the current climate, it is unprofitable to irrigate crops that are not very sensitive to
drought conditions. However, as droughts become more severe and frequent with
climate change it becomes profitable to irrigate these crops as well, resulting in an
increased irrigated area.
Consequently, the average regional income nearly doubles within 10years and the
income variation decreases. Remarkable is that the average regional income becomes
higher than that in the current climate scenario, and it increased by approximately
33%. This can be explained by the fact that under climate change the potential crop
production increases; due to increased temperatures and more sunshine the potential
evaporation of the crop increases. The potential crop production is here defined as the
maximum crop production under the assumption that enoughwater would be available
to fulfill the crop’s water requirement.
These results should be interpreted carefully as it may convey the impression that
climate change is good as it eventually results in income growth. However, the increase
in regional income is accompanied by a large increase in the collective water demand.
In the case of climate change, the cumulative water demand increases approximately
with a factor 2 and 5 (Figs. 8, 9). A main question remains to what extend the water
system will be able to facilitate the demand.
In this analysis, we assumed that the irrigation water demand from the external
water system can be met both in the current climate and in the case of climate change.
Indirectly, we assume that publically financed infrastructure or policy instruments
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are in place to facilitate agricultural water demand. However, recent evidence shows
that currently in extreme dry years, the water demand cannot be met and that large
public and private infrastructural investments are required to facilitate irrigation water
demand in the future. Furthermore, usually these are long-term investment and there
could be a significant time lag between the moment of decision to go for irrigation and
the actual ability to use it effectively. Through these model assumptions, many other
economic costs are not accounted for, for example the effect of large public adaptation
investments or the effects of policy instruments on the agricultural sector and the rest
of the economy. An important question to address in future research is whether it is
cost-effective to facilitate this water demand.
5.3 Switching between behavioral strategies
Figure 5 shows that the adoption process in the Consumat scenarios is delayed com-
pared to optimization scenarios due to the reliance on social network for adoption
diffusion. Specifically, this figure shows that the path of the share of adopters follows
an S-shaped curve, which is a standard empirical stylized fact in the field of technology
diffusion (Rogers 2003) and that, compared to the climate change scenario, it takes
more time for the adoption process to set off. In the first stage, farmers are reluctant
to adopt up to a certain point where the adoption rate increases and finally stabilizes.
To clarify this pattern, the left side of Fig. 10 shows the dynamics of the share
of farmers switching between the four Consumat decision strategies in the current
climate scenario. In the beginning of the experiment, the majority of farmers is relying
on repetition, indicating that this group is satisfied and certain. And, consequently,
they have no incentive to change their behavior. However, the figures of the other
strategies and the spread of the results show that this is verymuch dependent on climate
variability. Depending on the climate variability in the beginning of the experiment,
farmers may become unsatisfied with their income and rely on deliberation or become
uncertain and rely on imitation or social comparison.
However, even though some farmers are uncertain and/or unsatisfied in the current
climate, Fig. 5 shows that they are reluctant to adopt in the current climate; farmerswho
rely on any other decision strategy than repetition do not adopt because the information
they acquire is not convincing enough to change their behavior. In the case of farmers
who rely on deliberation (i.e., equal to economic optimization), this information is
a calculation of the expected costs and benefits of adoption. For many farmers, the
adoption benefits do not compensate the adoption costs in the current climate, and
therefore, only few of them adopt irrigation. For farmers who rely on the strategies
imitation and social comparison, the information is coming from their social network.
Once they observe that the majority of their weak or strong links have adopted, they
will also adopt.
In fact, the adoption process should be initiated by farm agents who rely on delib-
eration, as agents who rely on strategies involving social interactions only adopt when
the majority of their connections have adopted irrigation. This process is slow in the
current climate, only few farmers that rely on deliberation actually adopt, and there-
fore, it takes a long time before the farmers who rely on their social network observe a
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majority of adopters of their weak or strong links. However, once a certain number of
deliberators have adopted, this is observed by agents relying on the Consumat strate-
gies involving social interactions, causing a nonlinear increase in the rate of adoption
(see Fig. 5). These results can also be traced back in Fig. 10. After more than 15years,
an increasing part of the farm population switches from social comparison, imitation
or deliberation to repetition, indicating that they are satisfied and certain after they
adopted irrigation.
The same underlyingmechanisms play a role in the adaptation process in the climate
change scenario (see right side of Fig. 10). In first simulation years of this scenario,
fewer farmers rely on repetition and more farmers rely on deliberation than in the
current climate, indicating that they aremore unsatisfied. Thismakes sense as droughts
become more frequent and severe in the climate change scenario, affecting farmers’
income and consequently their level of satisfaction. Combining the results of Fig. 5
and the right side of Fig. 10 shows that the farm agents who rely on deliberation judge
the adaptation options profitable under the climate change conditions. This causes
many early adopters compared to the current climate scenario. Consequently, other
farmers who rely on imitation or social comparison observe the adoption in their social
environment and also decide to invest in irrigation equipment. Many of the farmers
who have adopted irrigation become certain and satisfied; this is shown by the large
number of agents that change to repetition.
6 Conclusions
This study has examined the effect of non-optimizing decision strategies and social
networks on the adoption of irrigation technologies across farmers in the southwest
Netherlands under several climate change scenarios. An ABM was developed which
is able to simulate the effect of droughts on crop production, farm income and farm
decision-making. Several aspects of themodel are calibrated based on empirical survey
data, and most importantly, this paper is one of the first attempts to include empirically
calibrated social networks in the analysis. Four experiments were conducted combin-
ing two climate scenarios with two behavioral scenarios. The results provide several
insights in the role of heuristics, social networks and climate change on farmers’
adaptation pathways.
When farm agents rely on heuristics and social networks, the adoption process
follows a different path than under optimization. The adoption process takes more
time as farmers rely on information flows within their social network to inform their
decisions.When agents do not observe a satisfactory number of adopters in their social
network, they remain uncertain and are reluctant to adopt. Once a particular threshold
of number of farmers has adopted the technology (critical mass), the adoption process
through social interactions takes off.
Uncertainty about the effects of climate change slows down the adoption process.
In the current climate, the adoption process through social interactions is slower than
under climate change. A large variability in climatic conditions and relatively mild
droughts affect farmers’ feelings of uncertainty, satisfaction and expectations on the
profitability of adaptation options. This causes a slower adoption of irrigation tech-
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nologies across the deliberators than with climate change. With climate change the
adoption process through social interactions takes off more quickly. Drought events
become more extreme, and farmers are less uncertain about their decisions. Conse-
quently, a large share of the farmers rely on deliberation and adopt quickly, followed
by other agents in their social network.
The delay in adaptation causes a loss of income in the short run compared to a
situation with perfectly rational behavior. However, in the long run the difference in
income vanishes. In the current climate, there is a very small effect of adaptation
on average regional income. However, the variability in regional income is reduced
due to adaptation. The regional income under climate change increases due to large-
scale adaptation and higher potential crop production. Investigating regional economic
dynamics based on behaviorally realistic agents shows that it suffices to have a few
rational agents and a well-functioning social network in order for the system to adapt
and show economic optimal behavior in the long run.
Heterogeneity of farmers’ behavioral properties allows us to identify successful and
unsuccessful farmers and to develop tailor-made solutions. Future in-depth studies to
the causality between farmers’ behavioral properties and successful behavior are in
demand. In this situation, a farmer’s feeling of uncertainty and the functioning of
social networks may be the key to stimulate adaptive behavior in the short run and to
consequently to avoid income loss in the short run.
However, these results should not be interpreted too positively. We cannot sit back
and wait. The higher income under climate change goes accompanied with a huge
increase in water demand. The question remains whether the water system is able to
facilitate this demand. The answer to this question points in a negative direction, as
river discharges are expected to decline in the future due to climate change induced
droughts in the Netherlands and developments in upstream countries. Farmers have
been served with sufficient water and good quality for several years; therefore, they
may rely on the government to act against the negative effects of climate change.
Reliance on public adaptation has been identified as one of the major barriers toward
adaptation to climate change. A future challenge will be to align public and private
adaptation efforts.
Even though this study has provided interesting insights, there are several limita-
tions. Firstly, we tested only one algorithm for farmers to form income expectations,
and predicted income is now an exponential smoothening function of the last N years.
However, if a farmer pursues an adaptation option, his predicted income should not
be anchored only on past income that was driven by previous choices and conditions.
Instead, predictions should be based on expectations about the future probability and
severity of droughts and the potential effects of climate change as these processes influ-
ence the future gains of drought adaptation. Several other algorithms are available,
and it would be interesting to explore the effect of different models for expectation
formation in future research.
Secondly, in this study crop prices are assumed to be constant. This may not be
realistic in cases of large-scale droughts that affect multiple areas in the world. Due
to large-scale losses in crop production, commodity prices may increase and farm-
ers’ drought loss may be (partially) compensated. Future works should test scenarios
for large-scale and small-scale drought through changes in crop prices. Finally, in
123
Going beyond perfect rationality: drought risk, economic…
the Consumat model farmers’ decision-making under risk is implemented through
an uncertainty ratio that reflects a farmer’s risk awareness. However, perceptions of
risk are often biased due to risk experience, perceived control or the influence from
social networks. Future research to the dynamics of farmers’ risk perceptions and its
implementation in an ABM is in demand.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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